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NOTES
Elden v. Sheldon: Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium Denied
to Unmarried Cohabitants
In Elden v. Sheldon,1 the California Supreme Court resolved an
issue that had divided the state's appellate courts, holding that an
unmarried cohabitant cannot claim and recover damages for loss
of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
decision of the court, while consistent with a majority of recent
holdings advocating limitations on liability in this area, is a controversial one. Two recent California appellate decisions had allowed recovery to unmarried couples, 2 and seemed to indicate a
growing acceptance by the courts of important relational interests
outside of traditional marital relationships and blood kinship. Because the Elden decision constitutes a retreat from this position,
and because the issues involved are likely to continue to be contested, the case is an example of common law at the crossroads,
between the pressure to adapt to new social needs and the desire
to preserve consistently applicable rules.
Part I of this Note presents the case and summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions. Part II considers prior law on negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium, and
argues that the development of the law in these areas requires a
reevaluation of the standards for recovery. Part III presents relevant policy concerns and reviews the assumptions of the majority
opinion in terms of its demographic and sociological implications.
Finally, the Note concludes that the majority's fear of overextending liability is misplaced, and that allowing the causes of action to unmarried cohabitants will serve, rather than impair, the
1. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 982, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).

2. Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 1983): for loss of consortium; Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210

Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985): for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Two cases that were on review by the Supreme Court, both dealing with loss of consortium

for unmarried cohabitants, were returned to the appellate level for disposition consistent
with Elden; see Lewis v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 569, 220 Cal. Rptr.
615 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1985) and Matuz v. Gerardin Corp., 204 Cal. App. 3d 128,

228 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986).
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goal of dealing with social realities in a just and equitable fashion.
I. THE CASE
The plaintiff, Richard Elden, was cohabiting with Linda
Eberling when they were involved in an automobile collision allegedly caused by defendant Robert Sheldon's negligence. Elden, a
passenger in Eberling's car, was seriously injured; Eberling was
thrown from the automobile and died a few hours later.3 Elden
sued Sheldon and the owner of the car Sheldon was driving, seeking damages for his own injuries, for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of witnessing the injury to his "de facto
spouse," and for loss of consortium.4 The defendants demurred to
the last two causes of action on the grounds that Elden and
Eberling were not legally married at the time of the accident. The
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.5 The
Second District Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, finding
that any decision to extend legal rights previously held only by
married persons to unmarried cohabitants is best left to the legislature." It called marriage "that fine bright line by which the
strength of a relationship may be tested" and defined marriage as
the only dependable means by which loss of consortium can be
determined.7 Similarly, the appellate court rejected the cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the grounds
that a failure to clearly limit recovery to "close" relationships in
the sense of legally cognizable ones would result in an indefinite
extension of liability.8 The California Supreme Court granted review of the case on April 25, 1985, and decided the case on August 18, 1988.
A.

The Majority Opinion

Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, first examined the cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court
relied on the landmark decision of Dillon v. Legg,9 the case in
which the California Supreme Court abandoned the earlier impact and zone of danger requirements. That decision, Justice
Mosk noted, controlled here because the parties to the action had
3. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
4. Id. at 269, 758 P.2d at 583, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
5. Id.
6. Elden v. Sheldon, 164 Cal. App. 3d 788, 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Cal. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1985).
7. Id. at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
8. Id. at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
9. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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framed the issue in terms of whether the plaintiff could recover
under the guidelines contained in Dillon, which were designed to
determine whether liability was reasonably foreseeable and to control a potentially limitless expansion of claims."0 The Dillon requirements limit recovery to plaintiffs who: (1) are located near
the scene of the accident, (2) experience emotional shock as the
result of a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and (3) are closely related to the victim.11
The court noted that the Dillon guidelines have been applied
flexibly with regard to physical proximity to the scene of the injury-causing event and the particular kind of sensory observance
of the accident that is required. 2 However, subsequent cases have
interpreted the "close relationship" guideline more strictly. 13
While courts have extended recovery for emotional distress to a
spouse, 4 sibling,' 5 or grandchild 6 of the victim, friends or more
distant relatives have been denied.' 7 The court disapproved the
later extensions of recovery to a foster mother whose close relationship with the victim child was known to personnel at the defendant hospital' 8 and an unmarried cohabitant who was twice
frustrated in attempts to marry the decedent, had borne his child,
and was economically dependent on him.' 9
The plaintiff argued that his emotional distress was foreseeable
under the Dillon tests based on the marked increase in the number of unmarried cohabitants in recent years; therefore, he
10. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 270, 758 P.2d at 583, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
11. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
12.

Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 270, 758 P.2d at 583, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255; see particu-

larly Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978), and
Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). In Archibald,
the mother of a boy injured in an explosion stated a cause of action under Dillon; she did

not see the accident occur, but arrived on the scene within moments. In Nazaroff,a mother
heard a neighbor shout "It's Danny" from a swimming pool area and arrived as her child,
who had drowned, was being pulled from the pool. The court determined that she could
state the cause of action because the shout may have permitted her to mentally "reconstruct" the scene (giving her a "sensory and contemporaneous" experience of the event

under Dillon). But see Frediani v. Haines, 197 Cal. App. 3d 523, 242 Cal. Rptr. 856
(1987); Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989),

discussed infra at note 52.
13. Id. at 271, 758 P.2d at 584, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
14.
15.
16.

Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982).
Genzer v. City of Mission, 666 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

17. Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1983):
recovery denied to first cousins with relationship alleged to be analogous to that of siblings;
Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983): recovery denied to

plaintiff who was "best friends" with the victim and treated as a "filial" member of the
plaintiff's family.

18. Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720 (1976).
19.

Ledger, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210 Cal. Rptr. 815.
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claimed, it was foreseeable that two persons in the same vehicle
may be unmarried cohabitants with a relationship equivalent to
that of a legally married couple.20 The court accepted the factual
premise of the plaintiff's argument, but concluded that an unmarried cohabitant's recovery was not acceptable. 2 It noted that Dillon recognized that policy considerations can bar a cause of action, even though the risk of harm was foreseeable, because social
policy requires a limitation on the consequences of a negligent
act. 22 The court then set out three policy reasons to justify its rejection of the plaintiff's claim.
First, the court emphasized the state's "strong interest in the
marriage relationship. 23 It reasoned that spouses do and should
receive special consideration from the state because of the solemn
and binding nature of marriage as a civil contract, and because of
the socially productive and individually fulfilling character of the
marital relationship. 4 To the court, this policy was not based on
anachronistic notions of morality. Rather, it rested upon the need
for an institutional basis to define the fundamental rights and responsibilities in an organized society.25 Additionally, formally
married couples possess statutory responsibilities (in terms of
property rights and the duty of support, for example) that unmarried couples have not undertaken.26 Therefore, granting unmarried
cohabitants the same rights and protections as married couples
would impede
the state's interest in promoting and protecting
27
marriage.
Second, the court determined that the allowance of a cause of
action in these circumstances would impose a heavy burden on the
courts.2 8 If the standards used in appellate decisions that allowed
the cause of action for unmarried cohabitants were used, they
would invite problems of proof and inconsistent results. 2 These
standards would also require a "massive intrusion" by the court
into the private life of the partners, and would not provide a suffi20.

Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 273, 758 P.2d at 585, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 257.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 273, 758 P.2d at 585, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
Id. at 274, 758 P.2d at 585, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
id.
Id. at 275, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59, quoting Nieto v. City of

Los Angeles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464, 470-71, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1982): case holding that

the wrongful death statute does not unfairly discriminate against unmarried partners.
25. Id. at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
26.

Id.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 276, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259; e.g. Butcher v. Superior
Court, supra note 2: whether the relationship was "stable and significant" as seen in evidence of its duration, whether the parties had a contract, etc.; Mobaldi, supra note 18:
whether the emotional attachments of a family relationship existed between the parties.
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ciently definite and predictable test to produce consistent results.30
Third, the court looked to the need to limit the number of persons to whom a negligent defendant owes a duty of care. 1 It declined to follow the rationale of cases allowing recovery to bystanders who had the functional and emotional equivalent of a
nuclear family relationship with the injured person, stating that
the need for a bright line in this area of the law was essential.32
The court simply could not "draw a principled distinction between
an unmarried cohabitant who claims to have a de facto relationship with his partner and de facto siblings, parents, grandparents
or children" and noted that the extension of liability and possibility of multiplication of actions and damages would place an intolerable burden on society.33
The court then discussed the cause of action for loss of consortium, and similarly declined to extend it to unmarried cohabitants.
It gave as reasons for its decision the intangible nature of the loss,
the difficulty of measuring damages, and the possibility of an unreasonable increase in the number of persons who would be entitled to sue; therefore, the cause of action must be narrowly restricted.3 4 The only decision in the state that permitted the right
to recover for loss of consortium to unmarried couples, Butcher v.
Superior Court"3 (provided that the couple's relationship was both
"stable and significant" as demonstrated by objective evidence),
had not been followed in subsequent decisions.3 " The court referred to the three policy reasons it discussed in terms of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, finding them equally relevant to a
denial of the cause of action for loss of consortium. Lastly, the
court asserted that its determination was not based on a value
judgment concerning the morality of unmarried cohabitation relationships, pointing to its decision in Marvin v. Marvin38 as evidence of its recognition
of the growing social acceptance of such
39
living arrangements.
30.

,Id. at 276, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 277, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260; Mobaldi, supra at note 18;
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974), allowing child to sue where he
witnessed a car striking his stepfather's mother, who had a close relationship with him.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 278, 758 P.2d at 589, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
35. 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (4th Dist. 1982)
36. Elden, at 278, 758 P.2d at 589, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
37. Id. at 278, 758 P.2d at 589, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
38. Id.; Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976):
case allowing unmarried cohabitants to enforce express or implied contracts relating to a
division of property or support.
39. Elden, at 279, 758 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Broussard disagreed sharply with the majority's conclusions, stating that "the convenience and certainty of a fool-proof
bright line is not sufficient to justify denying recovery to an entire
class of deserving plaintiffs on the arbitrary ground of marital status."' 40 In terms of negligent infliction of emotional distress, he
noted that the majority did not conclude that the plaintiff and victim were unrelated or distantly related, and that it did not dispute
the proposition that the sheer number of unmarried cohabitants
today made emotional trauma of this kind foreseeable.4 1 To Justice Broussard, this should end the inquiry,
42 as the closeness of the
parties is relevant only to foreseeability.
Justice Broussard then considered the policy rationales raised
by the majority opinion. In his view, the state's interest in marriage is not harmed by granting relief to a person who is already
injured. Instead, extending the cause of action to unmarried cohabitants would merely elevate them to a neutral status where
each plaintiff would be permitted to prove on a case-by-case basis
that his or her relationship is equivalent to that of a legal marriage and equally worthy of protection.43
Concerning the majority's argument on the burden to the courts
of determining whether a relationship is equivalent to a marital
one, Justice Broussard pointed to the ability of courts and juries to
regularly make intelligent and sensitive determinations of this
kind in assessing emotional loss. Therefore, assessing the stability
and significance of a relationship should be no more burdensome,
and the result can be determined with reference to objective factors, including the duration, degree of economic cooperation, and
the sexual exclusivity of the relationship. 44 Nor would this assessment be an invasion of privacy, for the common sense reason that
the unmarried plaintiff would have placed the quality and nature
of his or her relationship at issue by choice. 5
The issue of limiting liability also failed to convince Justice
Broussard, who disfavored the majority's insistence on a brightline rule that rests on definitional grounds rather than functional
ones related to real loss. 46 The bright-line rule based on marriage,
he noted, benefits only the tortfeasor who was fortunate enough to
40. Id. at 280, 758 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
41. Id. at 280-81, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
42. Id. at 280-81, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 283, 758 P.2d at 593, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 265. These factors were outlined
by the Butcher court; for further discussion, see page 186, infra.
45. Id. at 284, 758 P.2d at 593, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
46. Id.
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injure a cohabitor rather than a legal spouse; this acts against the
goal of tort compensation in a way that the significance
and sta47
bility standard of the Butcher case would not.
Justice Broussard was equally dissatisfied with these policy rationales as applied to the loss of consortium action. The court's
argument that precedent did not support extending liability was
particularly inadequate, because the action of loss of consortium
has evolved with a view to the common law's capacity to adjust to
social realities.4 8 As consortium today consists of relational interests including companionship, love, emotional support, and sexual
relations, the marital status of the plaintiff does not bear on his or
her standing to claim injury to these interests, and to maintain the
bright-line rule is to abdicate the court's duty to expand and develop the common law.49
In summary, the majority and dissenting opinions reflect two
trends in California law. The hesitance of the majority to extend
recovery to unmarried cohabitants for either negligent infliction of
emotional distress or loss of consortium may be attributable to the
change in the composition of the court (Chief Justice Bird and
Justices Grodin and Reynoso, viewed as the most liberal members
of the court, were removed by the voters in November 1986). In
earlier decisions-particularly Dillon-the California Supreme
Court demonstrated a readiness to extend protection to new
groups of individuals, regardless of the precedent in other jurisdictions.5 0 However, the tests established in Dillon have proven difficult to apply logically and consistently. 1 Therefore, the innovative
role of the California court seems to have been superseded by a
trend toward restraint, perhaps in an attempt to assure easy applicability of the only Dillon requirement (the "close relationship"
test) that 2 has not been substantially eroded by subsequent
5
decisions.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 285, 758 P.2d at 594, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
Id. at 286, 758 P.2d at 594-95, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67.
See Note, Limiting the Cause of Action of Loss of Consortium, 66

CALIF.

L.

REV.430 (1978), at 441.

51. In Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 168, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr.
661, 680 (1985), a case permitting a plaintiff mother recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress even though the injury to her child was not "a brief and sudden occurrence viewed contemporaneously by the plaintiff," Chief Justice Bird (concurring and dissenting) noted that "confusion and inconsistency are the result of a strict construction of
the Dillon guidelines" (p. 186), including the close relationship factor. See id. at 184-86,
703 P.2d at 18-20, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
52. Recently, in Thing v. La Chusa, supra note 12, the California Supreme Court
directly addressed the problematic nature of the Dillon tests. Justice Eagleson, writing for
the majority, noted that "[t]he issue resolved in Eldon was too narrow to create that
"bright line" for all NIED [negligent infliction of emotional distress] actions." 48 Cal. 3d
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II. PRIOR LAW AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A.

Loss of Consortium

As previously noted, the decision in Butcher v. Superior Court

gave the California courts a new standard for evaluating loss of
consortium claims-one based on the permanence and strength of
the relationship, rather than its legal status.5 3 That decision can
be seen as the culmination of the development of the tort over the
last two decades in California, and consequently, an examination
of earlier case law is instructive here.

Historically, the loss of consortium action was available only to
husbands.5 The consortium action primarily afforded protection
to the husband's proprietary interest in his wife's services, and was
a logical extension of the early common law right of the master to
sue for injuries suffered by his servant. 5 Over time, the basis for
at 664. However, Thing provided the court with the opportunity to reexamine Dillon in
detail. In Thing, the mother of a minor who was struck by an automobile brought an action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the driver of the car. The mother was
near the scene when the accident occurred, but did not see or hear it. Instead, she became
aware of her son's injury when her daughter told her about the accident; she then rushed to
the scene and saw her bloody and unconscious child lying in the street. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the facts established that the
mother was not present at the scene of the accident or aware of the injury when it occurred
(the "sensory and contemporaneous observance" requirement), and, therefore, she was unable to establish a right to recover.
The court went on to criticize and to clarify the Dillon test (though not to overrule the
case, as Justice Mosk noted in his dissent). It concluded that "a plaintiff may recover
damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a
third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is
present at the scene of an injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware
that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers emotional distress-a
reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not
an abnormal response to the circumstances. ... The merely negligent actor does not owe a
duty the law will recognize to make monetary amends to all persons who may have suffered
emotional distress on viewing or learning about the injurious consequence of his conduct."
Id. at 667-68. Significantly, the court disapproved Nazaroff and Archibald to the extent
they were inconsistent with this conclusion.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kaufman called for a return to the zone of danger rule
and the overruling of Dillon (based, like the majority opinion, on the difficulty of determining the stopping point for liability and the need for a clear, if arbitrary, standard for application by lower courts). Id. at 675-76. Justices Mosk and Broussard dissented, the former
pointing out the majority opinion's "callous disregard for the doctrine of stare decisis," (id.
at 681), the latter noting that "[tihe majority's strict requirement . . . is exactly the
'mechanical rule of thumb' that Dillon explicitly admonished us not to create. We should
follow Dillon and its progeny and maintain the rational and traditional rule that reasonable
foreseeability is the basis for determining liability." Id. at 685.
53. See discussion p. 179, infra.
54. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (5th ed. 1984), p.
931.
55. See, e.g., Guy v. Livesey (1619), Hyde v. Scyssor (1620); see Comment, Who
Should Recover for Loss of Consortium?, 35 ME. L. REv. 295 (1983), for an exhaustive
history of the tort.
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recovery in loss of consortium was extended to encompass damages from the loss of the husband's "relational interests" in his
wife-everything from loss of general companionship and society
to sexual relations. 6 As a result, the master-servant analogy became less and less tenable. However, the cause of action developed
slowly; it was only in 1950 that a court finally allowed a wife to
recover for loss of consortium based on a negligent injury to her
husband.57 In California, the cause of action for loss of consortium
was limited to recovery for economic loss in cases from 1917 to
1955; in the latter year, an appellate court awarded compensation
under the cause of action to a husband for the noneconomic damage to his marital relations. 8 In 1974, California Supreme Court
recognition of the modern cause of action began with the case of
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.59

In Rodriguez, Richard and Mary Anne Rodriguez had been
married for sixteen months when Richard suffered a severe workrelated injury that left him paralyzed and in need of virtually
twenty-four hour care."0 Mary Anne experienced the psychological strains of supplying this care, of a restricted social and recreational life, and of the inability to have sexual relations or children
with her husband." The court held that each spouse had a cause
of action for loss of consortium, reasoning that its decision was not
a usurpation of legislative authority, but "a reaffirmation of our
high responsibility to renew the common
law of California when it
''
is necessary and proper to do sO. 62
The court in Rodriguez dismissed policy arguments stated in
earlier cases denying recovery,6 3 including the fear that extending
the cause of action to wives would encourage similar claims from
children or parents, and therefore leave the court without a
bright-line rule to follow. 6 4 It advocated instead the court's caseby-case analysis of claims, noting "[T]hat the law might be urged
56.

Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 388, 525 P.2d 669, 672,

115 Cal: Rptr. 765, 780 (1974).
57. Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852

(1950), overruled on other grounds, Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, 212 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
58. Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1033 (1955), cited in Note, Loss
of Consortium and Unmarried Cohabitors:An Examination of Tong v. Joeson, 14 U.S.F.

L.

REV.

133 (1979).

59.
60.

12 Cal. 2d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766.

61.

Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.

62.
63.

Id. at 398, 525 P.2d at 679, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449

(1958), denying a wife compensation; West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6
Cal. Rptr. 289 (1960), denying a husband compensation.

64. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 403, 525 P.2d at 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
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to move too far, in other words, is an unacceptable excuse for not
moving at all." 65
Subsequently, the California courts did face a series of attempts
to expand the tort to a wider range of relationships. Traditionally,
for example, a parent was not permitted recovery for the loss of a
child's consortium."6 In Baxter v. Superior Court (1977),67 the
California Supreme Court denied recovery to the parents of a minor who was permanently incapacitated after being given a general anaesthetic in preparation for surgery. Similarly, the court
resisted an attempt to extend the tort to a child's loss of its parent's consortium in Borer v. American Airlines (1977),68 in which
nine children whose mother was seriously injured when a lighting
fixture at an airport fell and struck her were refused a consortium
action. The Borer court perceived significant differences between
marital relations and the parent-child relationship (specifically,
the sexual component) that, in its view, called for a limitation of
the cause of action to the former type of relationship. 9 Looking at
the policy concerns involved, it relied on the same considerations
that the Rodriguez case had rejected, including the concern over
increased numbers of potential plaintiffs. °
However, the Borer court did not base its holding on a view of
consortium that was strictly defined by marital interests. Therefore, the decision has been seen as a tacit acknowledgement that
the cause of action is intended to protect a broader relational
65. Id. at 404, 525 P.2d at 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
66. Keeton, supra note 54, p. 935; in some states, only the father could sue for loss of
the child's consortium, see Keller v. City of St. Louis, 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.W. 438 (1899).
67. 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). More recently, the
parents of a child who suffered neurological damage during birth were denied recovery "for
what is essentially the loss of filial consortium" in Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 186
Cal. App. 3d 884, 894, 231 Cal. Rptr. 96, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist 1986). A concurring
opinion, by Justice Johnson, stated: "Although the case for allowing recovery for loss of
parentalconsortium may be somewhat more persuasive than the case for allowing recovery
for loss of filial consortium, I regard either as far more compelling than the rationale
supporting the existing cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
injuries the plaintiffs suffered are more substantive, more difficult to feign, and more readily quantified and compensated than the momentary shock of witnessing a horrible accident, or the insult of mistakenly being told one has a loathsome disease, or the like." Id. at
895, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
68. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
69. Id. at 444, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.
70. Id. at 448, 563 P.2d at 864, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307. More recently, Nix v.
Preformed Line Products Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 975, 216 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Cal. Ct. App.
5th Dist. 1985), relied on Borer in denying recovery to children for the loss of parental
consortium, but did so with some reluctance: "Borer ...is a Supreme Court case, and we
are bound by its decision. However, even though we must affirm the judgment of dismissal,
the recent developments in other jurisdictions, plus the many discussions in criticism of the
Borer result prompt us to point to the inconsistency in the law between husband and wife,
and parent and child." Id. at 986, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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interest. 71
The California courts first dealt with the possible expansion of
the cause of action to unmarried cohabitants in Tong v. Jocson
(1977).72 In Tong, the plaintiff and victim had begun living together approximately three months before the victim was injured
in a car accident. 3 They married less than a month later, and the
plaintiff then sued for loss of consortium. The court tersely denied
the cause of action, holding that because the couple were unmarried at the time of the accident, they fell outside the narrow limits
of the tort.74 Another appellate decision, Lieding v. Commercial
Diving Center,75 similarly held that the cause of action does not
extend to a married plaintiff who was engaged to the victim at the
the accident, but did not marry the victim until a later
time 7of
6
date.
Two federal court decisions did allow unmarried cohabitants
the right to sue for loss of consortium; these holdings were frequently cited in subsequent California cases. In Sutherland v.
Auch Inter-Borough Transit,77 the plaintiff married the accident
victim less than one month after the injury occurred. However,
the court permitted recovery, noting the short amount of time between the accident and the marriage. The plaintiff's recovery was
limited to the loss from the date of the marriage.78 While the
court failed to specifically address whether unmarried cohabitants
could recover, the case still provided an important exception to the
requirement of a legal marriage at the time of the injury.
In Bulloch v. United States Diving Center,79 David and Edith
Bulloch were married for over twenty years and had two children.
They then divorced, but communicated regularly, had agreed to
remarry before David was injured, and continued living as husband and wife when he returned home after hospitalization for his
injuries.80 The court allowed Edith's action for loss of consortium,
pointing out that cohabiting couples represent a small percentage
71.

See Comment, Loss of Consortium:Should CaliforniaProtect Cohabitants'Re-

lational Interest?, 58 S.

CAL.

L. Rav. 1467 (1985), at 1474.

72. 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1977). The
Borer court focused on the absence of the sexual element to distinguish parental consor-

tium from spousal consortium.
73. Id. at 604, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
74. Id. at 605, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 728; subsequent cases have tended to limit Tong to
its facts, in view of the short time the couple had cohabitated; see Butcher, 139 Cal. App.

3d at 65, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
75.

143 Cal. App. 3d 72, 191 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1983).

76.

Id. at 73, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 560.

77.

366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

78. Id. at 134.
79.
80.

487 F. Supp. 1078 (D. N.J. 1980).
Id. at 1081.
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of all couples, and therefore if a line should be drawn to stop a
substantial accretion of liability, children should be denied the
claim rather than cohabiting partners.8"
In Butcher v. Superior Court (1983),82 a California court found

the arguments of the Bulloch court strongly persuasive and allowed the cause of action to an unmarried partner. The defendant
in Butcher struck and injured Paul Forte with his automobile.
Cindy Forte, who had been living with Paul for eleven and a half
years, sued for loss of consortium.83 She had used Paul's surname
since the relationship began; the couple had two children together,
filed joint income tax returns, and maintained joint savings and
checking accounts.84 The Butcher court viewed the purpose of the
cause of action as protection of the parties' relational interest, recognizing the shift in the theory of loss of consortium from a proprietary entitlement to compensation for damage to the continuing
relationship of the parties.8 Therefore, recovery was appropriate,
provided the plaintiff could show the relationship was both stable
and significant, and thus parallel to the marital relationship. 6 The
Butcher court proposed that an examination of several relevant
factors would help to determine whether the relationship in question met this standard, including (a) the duration of the relationship, (b) the existence of a mutual contract, (c) degree of economic cooperation and entanglement, (d) exclusivity of sexual
relations, and (e) whether there is a "family" relationship with
children. 7 The court found that the relationship between Cindy
and Paul Forte met the standard, and consequently, that Cindy
Forte could state the cause of action.8"
The test used in Butcher was applied in 1984 in Grant v. Avis

Rent A Car System, Inc.,a" but the court found that the brevity of

the unmarried couple's cohabitation before the injury-causing
event made their relationship, as a matter of law, not stable or
81. Id. at 1086; however, Bulloch and Sutherland were subsequently repudiated in
the relevant states. See: Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10, 445 A.2d 45
(1982); Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J. Super. 591, 444 A.2d 1141 (1982); Rockwell v.
Liston, 71 Pa. D. & C. 2d 756 (1975). The cases were criticized as poor predictions of the
course of New Jersey and Pennsylvania law; see Childers, 444 A.2d at 1142. Nonetheless,
California courts have repeatedly looked to the cases as persuasive authority; see Gonzalez
v. Hudson, 200 Cal. App. 3d 45, 245 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988), for a
recent example.
82. 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1983).
83. Id. at 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.

84. Id. at 60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
85.
86.

Id. at 61, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
Id. at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.

87. Id.
88.
89.

Id. at 71, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
158 Cal. App. 3d 813, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (1984).
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significant."
However, the Butcher decision was not followed in Ledger v.
Tippitt,91 which denied the cause of action for loss of consortium. 9 2 The Ledger court, dealing with facts similar to those in
Butcher, found the stable and significant standard unworkable and
capable93of nearly as many definitions as there are jurors to interpret it.
Therefore, the state of the law of loss of consortium before
Elden indicated that the courts, while cognizant of the particular
status of the "de facto" spouse as compared to other kinds of relationships, have moved cautiously in this area. For this reason, the
Ledger decision, which dealt with both loss of consortium and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, suggested a way to resolve the issue by allowing unmarried cohabitants to recover for
the latter tort, but not the former. However, the Elden court rejected this solution and chose to limit both causes of action.
B.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Traditionally, courts were reluctant to allow recovery for
mental distress. 94 While various decisions have attributed the denial of recovery to problems of objective proof of the emotional
distress and the possibility of fraudulent claims,95 the primary reason for rejection of the cause of action lies in an effort to prevent
unlimited liability.96 Recovery was initially confined to cases
where the emotional distress was accompanied by a more demonstrable harm, and courts demanded an accompanying physical im97
pact to the plaintiff, even if the contact was only a minor one.
The subsequent "zone of danger" rule adopted by the courts allowed plaintiffs relief for emotional distress if their personal safety
was threatened, even if they managed by chance to escape physical harm.98
California courts followed this restriction and refused to permit
the cause of action where the plaintiff was not in fear for his or
her own safety, even where the emotional distress arose from wit90. Id. at 818, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
91. 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).
92. The Ledger court did allow the plaintiff's cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, as discussed infra at pp. 189.

93. Id. at 638.
94. Keeton, supra note 54, at 360.
95. Keeton, supra note 54, at 361.
96. Elden, at 274, 758 P.3d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
97. See, e.g., Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961): any

degree of physical impact, no matter how slight; Freedman v. Eastern Mass. Street Ry.
Co., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N.E.2d 739 (1938): dust in the plaintiff's eye.
98. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
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nessing an injury to a close relative. 9 Only in 1968 did the California Supreme Court reject the impact and zone of danger rules
in Dillon v. Legg.' In that case, the court upheld a cause of action for a mother's emotional distress when she personally witnessed the death of her daughter, who was run over by a negligent
motorist. The mother herself viewed the incident from a position
of safety. However, the court rejected earlier case law that denied
recovery to bystanders because of the possibility of fraudulent and
indefinable claims. 101 It opted, instead, for a policy of case-by-case
resolution of claims, and the limiting tests that the plaintiff be
close to the accident in time and place, and be a close relative of
the victim.102 The court did not, however, attempt to make a determination of whether liability would be imposed where some of
the above factors were absent or of reduced weight when compared to the Dillon facts.'03
California case law subsequent to Dillon interpreted the "close
relationship" guideline expansively. In Mobaldi v. Regents of the
University of California (1976), a foster mother held her foster
son while hospital personnel injected the child with a drastically
unsafe solution. 04 The child went into convulsions in her arms
and suffered irreversible brain damage. The court concluded that
the foster mother could state a cause of action.
The Mobaldi court looked to the facts that the foster mother
had attempted to adopt the child, that the two held themselves out
to the public as mother and child, and that they were treated and
referred to as such by the medical personnel. 10 5 Consequently, the
court reasoned that the relationship of foster mother and foster
child was not distant, and "possessed all the incidents of parent
and child, except those flowing as a matter of law."'0 6 Therefore,
the emotional attachments of the family relationship, the court
held, and not07 legal status, are those that are relevant to
foreseeability.
The court viewed the close relationship guideline more restrictively in Drew v. Drake (1980)."08 The plaintiff in Drew alleged
that she had lived with her "de facto spouse" continuously for
99. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1958).

100.
101.
102.
103.

68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (1968).
Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.

104.

55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723.

105. Id. at 577, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
106. Id. at 528, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
107. Id. at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
108.

110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1980).
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three years when he was killed in a vehicle collision caused by the
negligence of the defendants. 10 9 She witnessed his death in the accident and sought recovery for her emotional distress. The court
held that the close relationship standard encompassed neither
friends, housemates, nor "persons standing in a 'meaningful relationship.' "110 It distinguished Mobaldi on the grounds that the
physicians in that case knew of the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. Here, it concluded, there was
no "family relationship" and no allegation that the defendants
knew or should have foreseen any other kind of relationship between the plaintiff and the victim."' Similarly, appellate cases
which followed limited reasonable foreseeability to parties related
by law to the victim, and2 viewed Mobaldi as a lone exception to
the acknowledged rule."
However, it was clear that the method of defining a "close relationship" was by no means settled. A dissent by Justice Poch6 in
Drew pointed out that the majority in that case had focussed on
the lack of a family relationship between the parties, and had
therefore rewritten the third Dillon guideline." 3 To Justice Poch6,
the possibility that a tortfeasor could foresee that his victim could
have a close relationship with someone to whom she was not legally married, given the degree of cohabitation in modern California society, was neither unexpected nor remote. 114 Rather, he concluded, the majority appeared to have misinterpreted Dillon's
order to analyze each case in terms of what the ordinary person
should have foreseen and to have based its holding on mere adherence to an older morality." 5
The majority opinion in Drew failed to control in Ledger v. Tip6 where the Court of Appeals permitted the cause of action
pitt,"1
on similar facts. In Ledger, plaintiff Jennifer Ledger and Richard
Arters had cohabitated for approximately two and one half years.
They had a child together, and had twice been frustrated in attempts to marry."17 Ledger witnessed the stabbing of Arters by
the defendant, and he died in her arms. While the court, as previously noted, held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for loss
of consortium, it upheld her claim for negligent infliction of emo109.

Id.

110.
111.
112.

Id. at 557, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 558, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 66.

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 559, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1985).

117.

Id. at 631, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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tional distress."" The court distinguished Drew on its facts,11"
holding that it was foreseeable as a matter of law that when the
defendant stabbed Arters, the woman seated in the car a short
distance away was likely a loved one who would suffer extreme
1 20
emotional distress as a result.
Elden, on the other hand, signals a return to the holding of
Drew and the desire of the courts to fix a definitive line between
those who may recover and those who may not. This conclusion
seems even less appropriate when applied to negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The foreseeability analysis used by the court
should allow for recovery by unmarried couples, particularly in
view of the broad class of persons allowed
to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.12 '
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND EVALUATION

A.

The State's Interest in Marriage

Courts have generally required marriage as a prerequisite for
the torts discussed here because it supplies a dependable means by
which a relationship may be legally defined and by which its
strength may be tested.122 As the Elden majority noted, the binding nature of legal marriage as a civil contract presumably weeds
out the unstable and impermanent relationships cohabitation encourages.123 As the court in Childers, a New Jersey case denying
the right to loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants, stated,
"Plaintiffs here were engaged to be married at the time of the
accident; how long an engagement will support a claim? One
month? One week? "Going steady?" . . . Presumably, when partners wish24 social and legal recognition of their relationship, they
marry."1
Decisions of this type make the right to the cause of action dependent upon acceptance of the legal responsibilities of marriage.
118. Id. at 646, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
119. Id. at 647, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 827; Ledger's two attempts to marry Arters, her
decision to bear his child, her economic dependence upon him, the "appalling facts relating
to the sudden assault," and his death in her arms.
120. Id. at 646, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
121. Ledger, at 640, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 822; the majority opinion explicitly compares
the two torts, noting that, in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, recovery has
been allowed where the witness to the injury was not related to the actual victim. See pp.
640-42, 210 Cal. Rptr. at pp. 822-24.
122. Childers, 444 A.2d at 1142.
123. For a summary of four models of the role of premarital cohabitation and later
marital quality, see Booth & Johnson, PremaritalCohabitationand Marital Success, 9 J.

FAm. IssuEs 2, 255-72 (June 1988). The conclusions of the authors, however, are highly

arguable, given the sampling technique used.
124. Childers, 444 A.2d at 1143.
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As Justice Broussard's dissent points out, the Elden majority
treats tort recovery as a benefit deriving from the marital compact, as if only married individuals have any real expectation that
the law should recognize the value of their relationships and feelings. 2 ' This assumption, however, is increasingly unrealistic. The
dramatic increase in cohabitation during the last two decades has
been noted in many of the previously-discussed decisions, frequently in terms of statistical arguments based on census data,' 26
It is also important to note that numerical assessments tend to
underrepresent the phenomenon, because many persons who are
not currently in a cohabitating
relationship have previously
2
cohabitated without marriage. 7
Therefore, it is particularly necessary to examine the Elden
court's reliance on the argument that particular social functions
are served by marriage that cannot be served by a cohabital relationship, and the specific problems the approach poses.
First, the functional similarity of cohabital relationships and legal marriage has been noted repeatedly. The argument against
further legal recognition of cohabital relationships categorizes cohabitation with a class of ephemeral relationships that lack emotional commitment and the economic and social responsibilities
and permanence that legal marriage implies. However, given the
high percentage of marriages that end in divorce and the fact that
courts have made cohabital relationships increasingly difficult to
terminate, the view of marriage as the sole stable domestic arrangement is open to question. 28
Moreover, it has been noted that the "stable and significant"
standard proposed by Butcher actually supports the policies that
foster marriage, in that the case required a showing of marriagelike conduct to establish a relational interest deserving the protections afforded to the marital relationship. 29 On the other hand,
the present rule sacrifices a fair appraisal of loss in a particular
125. Elden, at 282, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
126.

See particularly Bulloch, 487 F. Supp. 1078, at 1086.

127. See Thornton, Cohabitation and Marriage in the 1980s, DEMOGRAPHY (Nov.
1988).
128. Comment, Loss of Consortium Claims by Unmarried Cohabitants: The Role of
Private Self-Determination and PublicPolicy, 57 IND. L.J. 605 (1982) [hereinafter Private
Self-Determination], p. 615; as an interesting aside, see Liss, "Families and the Law," in
M. SUSSMAN & S. STEINMETZ, EDS., HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY (1987), p.
790, which mentions that the consequences of Marvin-type decisions may be a decrease in
cohabitation because it would carry all the legal aspects of marriage; see also ELLIOT, THE
FAMILY: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY? (1986), at 178: "Paradoxically, alternative life-style
ventures are rooted in ideas and beliefs which, in important respects, are continuous with
conjugal family ideals."
129. Note, An Unmarried Cohabitant Can Sue for Loss of Consortium if the Relationship is Both Stable and Significant, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 115, 133 (1984).
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situation for consistency. As the Bulloch court noted, the Elden
rule would allow recovery to a newly married couple on the basis
of far less evidence of a strong relational interest, and deny it to a
cohabiting couple of many years' standing. 130
Second, the court's decision, as noted by Justice Broussard's
dissent, has obvious ramifications for homosexual couples as well.
As these cohabitants do not have the right to marry, 13 1 or the possibility of the court's applying strict scrutiny to marital status
classifications,13a a bright-line rule utterly precludes recovery. For
example, in Coon v. Joseph,33 a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress was denied as a matter of law to a
man who witnessed an attack on his homosexual partner, with
whom he cohabitated and shared a stable and exclusive relationship.134 The court implicitly classed this relationship with that of
friends or housemates, which had never been considered as "close
relationships" under Dillon, and saw the inclusion of intimate homosexual relationships within the Dillon standard as a danger to a
clear limitation on tortfeasor liability.135 However, as Justice
White pointed out in his dissent, the majority's opinion would preclude homosexuals from ever recovering for emotional distress, no
matter how stable and significant the relationship or how foresee13 6
able such a relationship might be in contemporary society.
Third, a rigid adherence to the traditional limitations of the
causes of action ignores the responsibility of the courts to update
the common law where it reflects anachronistic notions. The Rodriguez and Butcher courts both noted the special duties of the
courts in relation to common law torts. 37 The Rodriguez court
130. Bulloch, at 1087.
131. Cal. Civ. Code § 4100 (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1988): "Marriage is a personal
relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of

the parties capable of making that contract is necessary." The words "between a man and
a woman" were added in a 1977 amendment to the statute.
132. See Note, Marital Status ClassificationsProtectingHomosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. Ill (1986); also Hinman v. Department of
Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985): strict scrutiny not

applicable re statutes differentiating on basis of marriage, since class of unmarried persons
is not suspect and the state has a legitimate interest in promoting marriage. Petitioners had
sought eligibility for cohabitants for dental benefits as state employees' "family members,"

and alleged an equal protection violation because same-sex partners were necessarily excluded from enrollment. See also Comment, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation
and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1584 (1989), at pp. 1620-23.
133. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1987).
134. Id. at 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 874.

135.

Id. at 1275, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877.

136.

Id. at 1284, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 883; Coon, however, was probably a poor test

case for the principles involved, as the defendant's conduct probably would not have caused
an ordinary person to foresee that a bystander would suffer any substantial distress; see
White's dissent, id.
137. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 2d at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512; Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 2d
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was particularly eloquent with regard to the adaptability and energy of the common law tradition, pointing out "[t]hat vitality can
flourish only so long as the courts remain alert to their obligation
and opportunity to change the common law when reason and equity demand it." 138 The responsibility of the courts to unmarried
individuals who have suffered real losses is not served by a
mechanical application of the law, which denies the importance
and foreseeability of these relationships. Instead, a flexible standard that would allow for a case-by-case evaluation would serve
the goal of recognizing the value of a significant and stable relationship (whether between married or unmarried cohabitants),
while still avoiding the extension of liability to remote claimants.
B.

The Burden on the Courts

The Elden majority expressed concern that the "stable and significant" test would excessively burden the courts, acting both as
an intrusion on the privacy of the parties and as an indefinite and
unpredictable standard."' As previously noted, Justice Broussard
found this objection without foundation, in view of the capabilities
of courts to make appropriate factual determinations in other subjective contexts and the obvious willingness of the plaintiffs to
hold 14out
their relationships for examination in cases of this
0
type.
An example of a situation in which precisely this sort of intrusion on privacy must occur arises in actions for loss of consortium
where the plaintiff and victim had a common law marriage.
Though California does not allow common law marriage creation,
its courts recognize common law marriages validly created in
states that do allow them.141 As a result, if the plaintiff and victim
were fortunate enough to cohabit or represent themselves to others
as married in a state that permits common law marriage, the
cause of action is permissible in California courts. It is inconsistent that the courts will assume that the requisite close relationship may exist in cases like these, while couples who have lived
at 394, 525 P.2d at 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
138. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 2d at 394, 525 P.2d at 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
139. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 276, 758 P.3d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
140. Id. at 283, 758 P.2d at 593, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264; see infra at notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
141. Etienne v. DKM Enterprises, 136 Cal. App. 3d 487, 188 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982);
Cal. Civ. Code § 4104. Common law marriage has been disfavored as a source of perjury
and fraud, as its requirements were easily met (intent, with continuous cohabitation and
public declaration that the parties are husband and wife). See Comment, Private SelfDetermination, supra note 127, at 619-20. Tortfeasors can be protected from the collusion
of claimed cohabitants by examination of detailed objective evidence, as in the Butcher
tests.
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continuously in California are unable to state the cause of action.
Marvin v. Marvin, and other cases recognizing the significance
of nonmarital relationships, indicate that an examination of the
conduct, agreement, or tacit understanding of the parties is feasible.142 In Marvin, the California Supreme Court recognized the
right of unmarried cohabitants to enforce express or implied contracts concerning the division of property or support 43 The court
looked to the fact that the couple had held themselves out as husband and wife, agreed to combine earnings, and that the plaintiff
had given up her career to devote her full time to the defendant-evidence similar to that recommended by the Butcher
court.1 44 If the "reasonable expectations" of the parties can be
evaluated by the courts in contractual terms, it is illogical to preclude a tort cause of action that requires no greater degree of
invasiveness.' 46
C. Limitation on Liability

The California court's insistence upon line-drawing implicitly
assumes that social policy must at some point limit liability.'46
However, this poses the problem of where the division should take
place. Justice Mosk, dissenting in Borer, felt that court had inappropriately denied recovery for loss of consortium to children, reasoning that the majority's emphasis on the sexual relationship between spouses as an important element of the cause of action was
misplaced. Rather, he felt that "Justice, compassion, and respect
for our humanitarian values requires that the "line" in this matter
be drawn elsewhere." 47 In Elden, Justice Mosk's majority opinion
clearly drew the line at unmarried cohabitants. While Mosk rejected concerns about a liability explosion with regard to recovery
142. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr 815 (1976). More recent examples: see Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1988); Taylor
v. Fields, 178 Cal. App. 3d 653, 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1986). Both cases (the former involv-

ing a homosexual relationship with cohabitation, the latter a 42-year intimate relationship
without cohabitation) indicate that courts clearly can decide which relationships are adequately stable and significant.

143. Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
144.

See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.

145. The Marvin court also noted that there are many reasons why couples might
choose to cohabit, and concluded that "the mere fact that a couple have not participated in
a valid marriage ceremony cannot serve as a basis for a court's inference that the couple
intend to keep their earnings and property separate and independent; the parties' intention

can only be ascertained by a more searching inquiry into the nature of their relationship."
Id. at 676, 557 P.2d at 117, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
146. Meade, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried: Time for a Reappraisal, 15 FAm.
L.Q. 223 (Fall 1981).

147. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 460, 563 P.2d at 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
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in parent-child situations,1 48 he raised precisely those objections to
the cause of action presented in Elden.
In this context, a demographic analysis is not only valuable, but
necessary. Courts have tended to rely heavily upon statistical data
as the basis for their arguments concerning extensions or limitations of liability. 49 Over the last twelve years (1977 to 1988), the
number of unmarried cohabitants has almost tripled, increasing
from 957,000 to 2,588,000 (see figure 1). However, the overall

number of unmarried cohabitants remains quite modest. The
highest possible number is approximately 2.6 million, which is
still less than 5 out of 100 couples in the nation in 1988.150 Additionally, the rate of increase in unmarried couples has slowed considerably in the 1980s. While the increase in these couples between 1970 and 1978 was 117%, the increase between 1980 and
1988 is only 63 %. Therefore, the rapid increase in the number of
unmarried cohabitants appears to be in the past. 5 ' As a result,

allowing recovery would have little effect on the total number of
possible claims, while recognizing the harm to these couples that

occurred.

148. Id. at 456-57, 563 P.2d at 868-69, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312. Justice Mosk relied
on Bureau of Census data: "During the peak working years of ages 25 to 65, the proportion
of all men who were married ranged between 77.8 percent and 89.7 percent.... The same
.source reveals that the proportion of families with several children is very low: as of 1974,
46 percent of the families in the United States had no minor children and an addition 19.2
percent had only I such child, making over 65 percent of the total; conversely, only 9.5
percent of families had 3 minor children, and the entire class of '4 or more' such children
comprised a mere 7.4 percent." (Id. at 457, 563 P.2d at 868-69, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13).
149. See Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 557 P.2d at 109, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 818; Bulloch, 487 F. Supp. at 1086.
150. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 432,
Households, Families, Marital Status, and Living Arrangements: March 1988 (Advance
Report), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., September 1988. The reason
for uncertainty here lies in the fact that the Census Bureau does not differentiate adequately between unmarried individuals who are cohabitating in a stable and significant
relationship and those in other living arrangements, such as roommates, tenants, employees, etc. An "unmarried couple" is defined as two persons of the opposite sex who share
their living quarters.

151.
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U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P-20, No. 432, Households, Families, Marital
Status, and LivingArrangements: March 1988 (Advance
Report), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., September 1988.
Table 5. Unmarried-Couple Households, by Presence
of Children: 1970 to 1988.

A similar trend is illustrated in figure 2. In 1970, 71.6% of all
U.S. households included a married couple; by 1988, only 56.7 %
did. Over the same time, the percentage of unmarried couple
hbuseholds increased from less than 1% in 1970 to 2.84% in
1988. Therefore, the actual number of households containing either a married or unmarried couple actually decreased over the
past nineteen years, from 72.4% in 1970 to only 59.7% in
1988.52

152. See note 150; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P-25, No. 1023, U.S. PopulationEstimates and Components of Change (Table 1,

Estimates of the Components of Population Change: 1970 to 1987).
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FIGURE 2
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Lastly, figure 3 supplies an indication of the possibilities for an
explosion of liability by showing the total percentage of the U.S.
population that is living in either married or unmarried couple relationships. In 1970, 44.5% of all persons in the U.S. were currently either a "husband" or a "wife." By 1988, this figure had
fallen to only 42.9 %. During the same period, using the previously mentioned Census estimate, unmarried couples went from
0.5% of all U.S. residents in 1970 to 2.1% in 1988. When the
"married" and "unmarried" couple figures are combined, the result shows that no change has occurred since 1970 (45.0% in both
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1970 and 1988). Thus, the total number of possible claims that
could be brought for loss of consortium by either a spouse or an
unmarried cohabitant has actually remained unchanged over the
last nineteen years. Even if recovery were to be extended to all
unmarried cohabitants even if they could merely show that they
were sharing living quarters, liability would not rise dramatically,
if at all; and, of course, an application of the Butcher "stable and
significant" tests would preclude recovery for those living in casual arrangements.
The statistical information indicates that the total number of
individuals who might have a cause of action for loss of consortium has declined (relative to population) since 1970. The fears of
the Elden court, then, concerning the extension of liability and its
accompaniment by an intolerable burden on society are misplaced.
Beyond this argument, however, lies the real matter at issue-the purpose of tort compensation. As Justice Gilbert recognized in his dissent in Ledger:
To deny recovery here because of the absence of a marriage certificate supplies a windfall to tortfeasors who may fortuitously
injure the partner of an unmarried couple rather than a married
one. The party who has suffered a real loss, such as Jennifer
Ledger, goes uncompensated. .

.

. It is true that bright lines are

helpful in fashioning rules that offer certainty and predictability
in the law, but if these lines 53
are too bright, they may blind us to
reality and to a just result.1
As in any tort cause of action, the courts here are faced with making a determination of which party should bear the loss. Because
the concern over potential double recovery that exists in the case
of parent and child recovery does not apply to unmarried cohabitants, an absolute denial of the causes of action to these individu-.
als is unwarranted; its consequence is to leave the injured party
without recourse.
CONCLUSION

This note has examined the decision of the California Supreme
Court in Elden both in terms of the development of the torts of
loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and in terms of the policy arguments adopted by the court. While
both of the causes of action have been applied more and more
flexibly with time, the Elden decision represents an attempt by the
court to hold to a consistent bright line rule in at least one area.
However, the court's rationales are unconvincing, and the rule ignores social realities. Extending the causes of action to unmarried
153.

Ledger, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 650-51, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 829-30.
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cohabitants will neither result in an explosion of liability nor defeat social policy goals. Rather, it will be indicative of the common law's ability to adapt to new familial arrangements and to
allocate losses fairly.
Sheila O'Hare*

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Donald C. O'Hare in the preparation of the statistical material in this article.
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